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PARENT'S TORT LIABILITY
PARENT AND CHILD - TORT LIABILITY OF PARENT
TO UNEMANCIPATED CHILD
Briere v. Briere, 224 A.2d 588 (N.H. 1966).
After 75 years of existence in this country, the doctrine of paren-
tal immunity may have been totally laid to rest in New Hampshire
by a recent state supreme court case, Briere v. Briere.1
In Briere the court held for two unemancipated2 minor chil-
dren in an action brought by their mother as next friend against
their father for injuries arising out of an automobile-truck collision.
The minors had been passengers in the automobile, which was
owned and operated by the defendant.
The issue, by stipulation, was "whether unemancipated minor
children may sue their father in tort for injuries sustained in an au-
tomobile accident."3  Thus the court was squarely confronted with
the opportunity to abrogate the doctrine of parental immunity.
The parental immunity doctrine was first announced in this
country in Hewlett v. Ragsdale,4 where a minor's action against her
mother for wrongful confinement in an insane asylum was denied.
The Mississippi court reasoned that both parent and child were un-
der reciprocal obligations: the parent must care for, guide, control,
and discipline the child, while the child must comfort, aid, and obey
his parent. The court indicated that allowance of the action would
have been contrary to public policy and disruptive of those reciprocal
obligations.5
It is interesting to note that the Hewlett court cited no cases in
support of its holding nor did it purport to rely upon a common law
rule. The question of whether a common law immunity doctrine
existed prior to Hewlett has remained a matter of opinion. This
unresolved issue has arisen from the absence of English cases,6 and
the near absence of American cases prior to 1891.7
1224 A.2d 588 (N.H. 1966).
2 Unless emancipation has occurred as a matter of law, it is a question of fact for the
jury. E.g., Parker v. Parker, 230 So. Car. 28, 94 S.E.2d 12 (1956).
8 224 A.2d at 589.
4 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891). "To some degree at least, the Mississippi case has
been followed by most of the courts of this country having occasion to rule on the sub-
ject." Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 423, 425 (1951) (footnotes omitted); see 67 CJ.S. Par-
ent and Child § 61(b) (2) (1950).
5 68 Miss. at 711, 9 So. at 887.
6 In Young v. Rankin, [1934] Sess. Cas. 499, 508 (Scot. 1st Div.), a British court
stated this issue as follows:
Is there any clearly settled rule or principle of the common law or the public
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Yet, in another early case, McKelvey v. McKelvey,8 where the
infant plaintiff was denied relief, a Tennessee court mistakenly
added that "so far as we can discover, this rule of the common law
has never been questioned in any of the courts of this country ... ."
Unfortunately, this language, referring to a "common law rule," was
incorporated in many subsequent decisions and has been a substan-
tial obstacle to the abrogation of the immunity doctrine."°
Fortunately, this obstacle posed no problem for the Briere court,
for it felt that prior to 1891 "there was no common-law rule that a
child could not sue a parent"" and, since the rule was court made
"[ilt is the duty of the judiciary to examine it and make such
changes as justice requires when the Legislature has chosen not to
act.'
1 2
The New Hampshire court then examined the immunity doc-
trine by analyzing the three reasons advanced by the defendant to
support his position that the lower court's dismissal of the action
should be sustained.
First, the court agreed with the defendant that there was a dan-
ger of fraud and collusion in allowing an unemancipated minor to
sue a parent. 3 However, the court indicated that these same dan-
gers were equally prevalent in actions between spouses, 4 other rela-
tives,'" and close friends " - all of which are permitted in New
Hampshire' 7 and in many other jurisdictions. 8
policy to prevent a son in minority, who had been injured through the fault
of the father, from maintaining an action to be compensated for his injuries?
I can find no such rule or principle, and we were referred to no judicial for-
mulation of it, if such a rule exists.
7 See Gould v. Christianson, 10 F. Cas. 857 (No. 5636) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1836)
(implication of parental immunity); Nelson v. Johansen, 18 Neb. 180, 24 N.W. 730
(1885) (implication of no parental immunity); Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 423, 429-30
(1951).
8 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903).
9 Id. at 390, 77 S.W. at 664.
10 See, e.g., Belleson v. Skilbeck, 185 Minn. 537, 539, 242 N.W. 1, 2 (1932).
11224 A.2d at 590.
121d.
13 Id.
14 E.g., Bennett v. Bennett, 224 Ala. 335, 140 So. 378 (1932) (allowing wife to
sue husband for automobile negligence); Leach v. Leach, 227 Ark. 559, 300 S.W.2d
15 (1957) (allowing husband to sue wife for automobile negligence); Lowman v.
Lowman, 166 Ohio St. 1, 139 N.E.2d 1 (1956) (allowing wife to sue husband for
negligent infliction of injuries); Jaeger v. Jaeger, 262 Wis. 14, 53 N.W.2d 740 (1952)
(allowing wife to sue husband for negligent operation of automobile).
15E.g., Overlook v. Ruedeman, 147 Conn. 649, 165 A.2d 335 (1960) (allowing
minor sister to sue minor sister for negligence); Russell v. Cox, 65 Idaho 534, 148
P.2d 221 (1944) (allowing mother to sue son-in-law for wrongful death); Herrell v.
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Furthermore, though the danger of collusion is increased when
the defendant is covered by liability insurance, there will seldom be
a suit for negligence when the defendant is uninsured. Even when
insurance is involved, the legal system is particularly well suited for
distinguishing honest and meritorious claims from false or fraudu-
lent ones; it is the court's function to determine truth in any type
of action. 9
With these considerations in mind, the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire rejected the defendant's "collusion" argument, stating
that the "mere opportunity for fraud and collusion" was far out-
weighed by the injustice of denying relief for a meritorious claim.2"
Next, the court considered the defendant's argument that the
maintenance of a suit by a minor against his parent would substan-
tially deplete family funds.2 ' This argument brings into play the
question of whether the existence of liability insurance should en-
large a minor's right of action against his parent.
Most courts refuse to consider the existence of liability insurance
as relevant to the maintenance of the action m since "so far as plain-
tiff is concerned, liability insurance pertains to collection of any
judgment that might be obtained .... . 23  There are a number of
Haney, 207 Tenn. 532, 341 S.W.2d 574 (1960) (allowing minor to sue his minor
brother for wrongful death); Midkiff v. Midkiff, 201 Va. 829, 113 S.E.2d 875 (1960)
(allowing minor to sue minor brother for automobile negligence).
16Zellers v. Chase, 105 N.H. 266, 197 A.2d 206 (1964).
17 Walker v. Walker, 106 N.H. 282, 210 A.2d 568 (1965) (husband and wife);
Zellers v. Chase, 105 N.L 266, 197 A.2d 206 (1964); Gilman v. Gilman, 78 N.H. 4,
95 A. 657 (1915) (husband and wife).
18 Cases cited notes 14-15 supra. For further discussion of suits between spouses,
see text accompanying note 34 infra. Of course, there has never been an immunity bar
in actions between other relatives or close friends. See generally Akers & Drummond,
Tort Action Between Members of the Family - Husband & Wife - Parent & Child,
26 Mo. L. REv. 152 (1961). For an excellent discussion of family immunities in Ohio,
see Sullivan, Intra-Family Immunities and the Law of Torts in Ohio, 18 W. REs. L.
REV. 447 (1967).
3 9 "Nor are lawyers apt to encourage litigation which has no merit, particularly
where the customary fee arrangement is a contingent one." Baits v. Baits, 273 Minn.
419, 430, 142 N.W.2d 66, 73 (1966).
20 224 A.2d at 590.
21Id.
22W. PRossm, TORTs § 116 (3d ed. 1964). While it is true that the parent's
insurance rates will rise if the suit were allowed, this factor appears insignificant in the
reduction of family assets, when the amount in controversy is substantial. For the in-
teresting argument that current rates reflect recent experience and therefore do not con-
template the parent's immunity, see Badigian v. Badigian, 9 N.Y.2d 472, 474, 174
NE.2d 718, 720, 215 N.Y.S.2d 35, 37 (1961).
2 3 Nahas v. Noble, 420 P.2d 127, 128 (N.M. 1966) (emphasis added).
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recent cases which have placed greater significance on the existence
of insurance as meeting the depletion of family funds argument.24
In Briere, the New Hampshire court agreed with the weight of
authority that the existence of liability insurance should not impose
a duty upon the defendant where no such duty existed before."
The court recognized that today parents are likely to carry insur-
ance and, "as a practical matter, the prevalence of insurance cannot
be ignored in determining whether a court should continue to dis-
criminate against a class of individuals by depriving them of a right
enjoyed by all other individuals."2  Thus, the policy arguments in
support of defendant's "fund depletion" argument failed in light of
the popularity of liability insurance.
The defendant's last reason for maintaining the parental im-
munity doctrine was that domestic tranquility and parental discipline
would be appreciably harmed if the suit were allowed.27 This ap-
pears to have been the chief reason for denying the minor's suit:2"
As often stated before, the sole debatable excuse advanced for
the denial of the child's right to sue is the effect a suit would have
upon discipline and family life. If, therefore, the situation is such
that the suit will not affect those matters at all, the reason for
the theory fails and it should not be applied.2 9
The "family harmony" approach serves to explain why most
jurisdictions have abrogated the immunity doctrine when the injury
complained of resulted from a parent's wilful, wanton, or malicious
act."0 This widely followed exception, mentioned in Briere,3" is
2 4 E.g., Dean v. Smith, 106 N.H. 314, 211 A.2d 410 (1965), cited in the Briere
decision, where minor unemancipated children were allowed to sue their father's estate
for the decedent's negligence. The court said that "the effect of general insurance cov-
erage by most motorists should be considered in determining whether the barrier pre-
venting an unemancipated child from obtaining redress for the wrongs inflicted on him
by the negligence of his parents should be removed." Id. at 318, 211 A.2d at 413. The
prevalence of insurance in many personal injury actions was similarly considered a
"proper element" in Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 412, 122 N.W.2d 193, 197
(1963).
25 224 A.2d at 590.
261d.
27 Id. at 590-91. One might critically question whether the reasons behind the im-
munity rule significantly cease to operate at emancipation.
2 W. PRossER, supra note 22, at 887; see 39 Am. JRIt. Parent and Child § 90
(1942).
2 9 Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 367, 150 A. 905, 912 (1930).
30 See, e.g., Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955) (permitting
unskilled driver to operate auto under unfavorable conditions); Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7
Del. 2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525 (1956) (driving recklessly in poor weather); Mahnke
v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951) (committing atrocious acts in front of
child); Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Ore. 282, 218 P.2d 445 (1950) (committting gross
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based upon the strained concept that this kind of misconduct forfeits,
abandons, or terminates the parental relationship, causing such a
disruption to family peace that the reason for immunity no longer
exists.
The family harmony reasoning fails when courts allow other
forms of action between the unemancipated child and his parent.
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire recognized that an uneman-
dpated minor child may sue his parent on a contract 2 or for some
wrong connected with property." While it could be argued that a
contract or property action is usually based upon the breach of a
voluntary, mutually beneficial agreement and a negligence action is
not, the difference between the effect of each type of action upon
family harmony is slight.
Still another inconsistency is that suits between other family
relations are maintainable. While at common law, tort actions be-
tween spouses were denied, a substantial minority of states now
allow personal injury suits between spouses."' Uniformly, actions
have been permitted between minor brothers and sisters and other
relatives,"6 and nearly always have been allowed against one in loco
parentis. 0 In many of these cases domestic tranquility will be sig-
nificantly disrupted; yet, no immunity rule bars their maintenance.
One exception to the immunity doctrine, not mentioned in
Briere, is that an unemancipated minor may maintain an action
against his parent if the act complained of is connected with the
parent's business or vocation." It appears that courts which allow
this exception are "making an artificial separation of vocational
from personal capacity, which suggests a dislike of the immunity
more than anything else."3"
negligence). Malice is a question of fact. Wright v. Wright, 85 Ga. App. 721, 70
S.E.2d 152 (1952).
31224 A.2d at 591.
321d. at 590, citing Hall v. Hall, 44 N.H. 293 (1862); see Comment, The Doctrine
of Parental Immunity: Rule or Exception?, 10 DE PAUL L. REV. 55 (1960).
3 3 See, e.g., Crowley v. Crowley, 72 N.H. 241, 56 A. 190 (1903) (permitting suit
regarding ownership of farm); McLain v. McLain, 80 Okla. 113, 194 P. 894 (1921)
(permitting action against father for rent of land occupied by father during plaintiffs
minority).
3 4 Note, Parent-Child Tort Actions, 12 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 339, 341 (1963).
35 Cases cited note 15 supra.
36 See, e.g., Wilkens v. Kane, 74 N.J. Super. 414, 181 A.2d 417 (Super. Ct. 1962).
3 7 
.g., Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952), where defendant
was operating a business vehicle for business purposes when he negligently ran over
his child.
38 W. PROSSER, supra note 22, at 888.
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Besides meeting the fund depletion argument, the existence of
liability insurance would seem to largely negate the possible ill ef-
fects of a suit between a child and his parent on family unity. In
the case of Balts v. Balts,"9 where a parent was allowed to recover
for injuries sustained in an automobile accident caused by the negli-
gence of the plaintiff's minor child, the Minnesota court expressed
the view, equally applicable to suits by minor children, that "where
a wrong has been committed of a character sufficiently aggravated
to justify recovery were the parties strangers, the harm has been
done.... [Tihe prospect of reconciliation is enhanced as much by
equitable reparation as by denying relief altogether, particularly
where the defendant is insured."4
In 1963 the Wisconsin Supreme Court almost completely abro-
gated the immunity rule in Goller v. White.4  There, a 12-year-
old child was permitted to maintain an action against a foster parent
for injuries sustained in an accident caused by the negligent opera-
tion of a tractor on a public highway. The court abolished the rule
prospectively" in personal injury actions, except in two situations:
"(1) [w~here the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of pa-
rental authority over the child; and (2) where the alleged negligent
act involves an exercise of ordinary parental discretion with respect
to the provision of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental ser-
vices, and other care."43
The Wisconsin court also noted the effect of insurance on pre-
serving family harmony and felt it was a proper element to be con-
sidered in changing the immunity rule.4 Obviously, this court felt
that family harmony rests on more than just financial well-being.
This is a valid point, but empirical data is needed to show the effects
of an intrafamily suit. One interesting aspect of the Goller case
was that the defendant's insurance policy was held mot to cover the
39273 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66 (1966).
40 Id. at 73. When a parent purchases an insurance policy his precise object is to
make the enforcement of a judgment innocuous.
4120 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
42 Id. at 414-15, 122 N.W.2d at 199 (supplementary opinion). In Downs v.
Poulin, 216 A.2d 29, 34 (Me. 1966), the Supreme Court of Maine, sustaining de-
fendant's motion for summary judgment, stated that "[ijf the rule in such cases is, as
the plaintiff contends, no longer suited to the times and should be dispensed with, the
proper way to accomplish that end is prospectively by legislation and not retroactively
by judicial decree ...."
43 20 Wis. 2d at 413, 122 N.W.2d at 198. For a very fine analysis of the Goller
decision, see Note, Parent and Child - Negligence - Abrogation of the Parental-Im-
munity Rule, 1964 Wis. L. REV. 714.
44 20 Wis. 2d at 412, 122 N.W.2d at 197 (1963).
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plaintiff, and the defendant's insurer was relieved from liability.45
Since the plaintiff was successful in spite of the lack of coverage, it
is arguable that the court felt that family unity would not be dis-
rupted by an intrafamily personal injury suit, unless the circum-
stances fell within either of the two exceptions - parental authority
or ordinary parental discretion. In all other cases, there would be
no immunity.
The real difficulty in the Briere case is deciding just how far the
Supreme Court of New Hampshire went toward destroying the im-
munity doctrine. Conceivably, future readings of the case could
be confined to the facts of Briere. Such an interpretation is sug-
gested by the court's reliance on Dean v. Smith4" and Gaudreau v.
Gaudreau47 which involved similar automobile negligence factual
situations.48
While the major distinction in automobile negligence cases is
the possibility of liability insurance coverage, still the New Hamp-
shire court pointed out that the defendants were only "generally"
protected from loss.49 Similar qualified language was employed by
the court when it stated that if the defendant were uninsured, the
chances of anyone bringing suit for the child would be remote.5"
Thus, the court's holding, even narrowly construed, still leaves room
for speculation as to whether actions against uninsured parents in
automobile negligence situations will be successful in the future in
New Hampshire. If so, then actions in other negligence situations,
where insurance similarly may not be a factor should also be per-
mitted.
However, the court seemed to feel that it was charting a new
course by allowing the plaintiffs' suits.5 If the Supreme Court of
New Hampshire were going only as far as the Goller decision, of
which it was aware,5" then it logically would have cited that deci-
sion, with its two exceptions, instead of purporting to proclaim a
new doctrine. Thus, the Briere decision suggests that New Hamp-
45 Id. at 409, 122 N.W.2d at 196.
40 106 N.H. 314, 211 A.2d 410 (1965). For another discussion of the Dean case,
see note 24 supra.
47106 N.H. 551, 215 A.2d 695 (1965), where an action by the representative of
the father's estate was maintained against an unemancipated minor.
48 224 A.2d at 591.
49Id.
50 Id. at 590.
51 Id. at 591.
52Brief for Appellant at 6, Briere v. Briere, 224 A.2d 588 (N.H. 1966).
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